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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION
On 23 September 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) formed the Unified Space Command (USSPACECOM) with headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The components of the new command 
are the Air Force Space Command, the Naval Space Command, and the Army Element. General Robert T. Herres was named Commander-in- Chief of the Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) which began deactivation after formation of USSPACECOM. 1
The missions of ADCOM were divided between USSPACECOM and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Those ADCOM missions reassigned to USSPACECOM are Attack Warning/Attack Assessment and Space Defense, renamed Space Control. Space Support, a previously unassigned space operation, was also 
assigned to CINC USSPACECOM or CINCSPACE.
Formation of USSPACECOM is an acknowledgement of the extent to which the National Command Authorities (NCA) and worldwide 
air, land, sea, and other space operational forces depend on the 
missions which space systems perform. CINCSPACE is responsible through the JCS to the NCA for conducting effective military 
space operations and integrating them into the military 
operations of the traditional forces. Space operations, therefore, will become more responsive to NCA direction and to the operational needs of the unified and specified CINCs. 2
The JCS tasked CINCSPACE TO "maintain assured access to and 
use of space for the U.S. and her allies at all times." 3 The purpose of this paper is to examine that task. What are the basic elements of space operations? How important are they? Is there a threat? If so, are U.S. space systems and operations 
strong enough to survive in the face of a determined effort to defeat them?
SECTION II 
ACCESS TO AND USE OF SPACE
The idea of access to and use of space involves terms and
concepts which require discussion. Chief among these are space
systems, space operations, and space missions. Space systems and space operations are the tools and activities required to perform space missions. Space missions are the services or functions 
which space systems provide to national and military users 
worldwide. In other words, space missions are the "...users.,. 11 of space, while space systems and operations represent 11 .. .access. . , lf to it.
SPACE SYSTEMS 
Any system which includes, supports, or is directed at an
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earth orbiting satellite is a space system. Satellites, 
spacetrack sensors, the Space Shuttle, expendable boosters, upper 
stages, anti-satellite weapons, and a myriad of facilities and 
air, land, and sea equipment are all space systems. The primary 
space systems exists because there are satellites. It is the 
earth orbiting satellite which actually exploits the uses of 
near-earth space in support of terrestrial forces.
Basically, satellites are composed of a platform and a 
payload. The platform contains all support subsystems required 
to serve the payload. These subsystems include the structure, 
automatic data processing, communications, electrical power, 
telemetry, orbit control, and attitude control. In addition, 
manned satellites contain life support and man-interface 
subsystems.
Military satellite payloads fall into one of four categories: 
sensor, communications relay, positional reference, and, in the 
future, weapons. A satellite's payload determines its mission. 
Some satellites have more that one payload. Some of these have 
more than one mission.
Whether it be one or many, the entire number of a particular 
kind of satellite performing a specific function or mission is 
referred to as a satellite constellation. Some satellite systems 
or the missions they serve are actually systems or 
constellations. Frequently, for example, an information 
collection constellation will relay information through a 
communications relay constellation.
Constellations are supported by launch and deploy facilities 
and vehicles, satellite control facilities, payload control or 
processing facilities, and recovery systems. These are referred 
to in this paper as earth support systems.
Space launch systems are the space launch vehicles and the 
facilities from which they are launched. Launch vehicles are 
more or less complex depending upon whether they are manned or 
unmanned, reusable or expendable, and upon how heavy a load they 
must carry how high.
The major launch facilities are located at Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. There 
is also a small facility at Wallop's Island, Virginia. Kennedy 
and Vandenberg have 14 launch complexes between them. 4 Launch 
complexes include not only the gantries form which the luanches 
occur, but also associated tracking, control and support 
facilities. Launch facilities represent ports of access to 
space.
U.S. space systems represent some of this country's most 
advanced technologies. They are unsurpassed in capability, 
sophistication, and longevity, however, Col Robert Griffin, 
author of u.s SPACE SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY, states that U.S space
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systems "... are frequently capable of 'gee whiz' performance, but are often complex and expensive." 5 Capability, 
sophistication, and longevity are expensive and require snail 
constellations with low replenishment production rates for 
satellites, boosters, and upper stages. While this nay appeal to 
a cost accountant in peacetime, it has alarming implications to 
military operators and users confronted by satellite attrition in 
crisis or conflict.
SPACE OPERATIONS
Space operations are categorized as either space support 
operations or space control operations.
Space support operations are those activities required to tend or support satellite systems and include luanch, satellite 
control, and recovery. The purpose of space launch operations is to place satellites into orbit. DOD space launch operations 
are complex. DOD Space Shuttle launch operations are conducted in cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). The Air Force is the executive agent for DOD space launches, shuttle or otherwise. 6 Air Force Systems Command executes Air Force launch responsibilities through its Space Division. Space Division, which is operationally 
responsive to USSPACECOM, conducts space launch activities primarily with an extensive network of commercial contractors.
The purpose of satellite control is to assure that satellite payloads are functioning properly and are programmed as required. Some satellite systems have dedicated control activities for these purposes. Others are controlled by the common user network 
called the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN). The Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) at Onizuka Air Force Base, California plus seven Remote Tracking Stations (RTS) around the world make up the common user network. Additionally, the Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) at Falcon Air Force Base near Colorado Springs, Colorado is taking on many 
responsibilities now carried by AFSCF and will provide 
redundancy.? Further, another RTS will be located on the CSOC 
complex. Whether dedicated or common user, satellite control 
operations depend on many nodes or "choke points" of activity. 
Destruction of these nodes is system fatal.
Space recovery operations have yet to be fully defined, but 
will include the recovery of orbiting objects for operational or logistical reasons and the recovery and turnaround of reusable 
vehicles such as the space shuttle.
Space control operations include spacetrack, protection, and 
negation.
The purpose of spacetrack is to detect, track, and catalogue
all man made objects in earth orbit. USSPACECOM radar and
optical Sensors around the world relay more that 45,000 daily
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observations on approximately 7000 orbiting objects to the Space 
Surveillance Center (SSC) in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, 8 Based
on this data, the SSC computes past, present, and future location 
of on-orbit satellites for various purposes and users, 
Spacetrack data and computations are fundamental for space 
operations.
CINCSPACE conducts space protection operations through the 
Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) also in Cheyenne 
Mountain. Space protection includes assessing all-source data to 
determine if hostilities in space are imminent or taking place, 
advising/ warning satellite owners/operators of such assessments, 
and, in the future, countering and defeating attacks against U.S. 
space systems.
CINCSPACE will also conduct space negation operations through
the SPADOC when and if weapons are'developed for that purpose. 
Negation operations do not fit into this discussion of access to 
and. use of space. They are mentioned here only to complete the 
list of space control operations.
SPACE MISSIONS
Space Missions are the services that spacecraft provide for 
DOD forces. 'They may be categorized as either force enhancement 
or force applications. 9 Force enhancement missions are combat 
support in, nature and. include communications, surveillance, 
reconnaissance r navigation, meteorology, and geodesy. 1 ° Force 
application, are direct combat operations which might employ 
earth-to-space, space-to-space, or space-to-earth weapons.
Space based seasons are the only systems capable of providing 
continuous, complete surveillance of the oceans and the Asian 
land mass to warn of sea and land launched ballistic missiles. 
This warning is a critical element in guaranteeing that U.S. 
strategic retaliatory forces will not be caught and destroyed by 
surprise.
Reconnaissance and intelligence have always been critical 
elements of mililtary opeations. The more reliable and timely 
the intelligence, the more valuable it is. Satellites in earth 
orbit are uniquely situated to gain routine and detailed 
observations of enemy positions at full depth.
'Communications nay be the most important activity conducted 
in crisis and conflict. Emergency action messages, command and 
coat rol f Inte1 1i gence, and logistics traffic mu s t c on t i nue 
unimpeded and secure from interception to assure that forces are 
deployed, employed, informed, and supported when and where 
needed. Seventy percent, of long haul communications pass through 
at least one satellite relay enroute. 11 ' '  
Aside from communications, soldiers, sailors, and airmen
benefit directly routinely from space based navigation
and meteorology systems. The accuracies associated with NAVSTAR Global Positioning System significantly improves navigation, geopositioning, and targeting. "Consider how important a
meteorological satellite... would have been to General Dwight D. Elsenhower in June 1944". 12 Throughout history weather has intervened in military operations positively or negatively on a tactical or strategic scale. Sufficient information to
accurately predict weather would allow strategists and tacticians to exploit conditions rather that be their victims.
Force applications space missions may be space oriented as
with earth-to-space or space-to-earth systems. These could be 
used defensively to protect U.S. satellites under attack or 
offensively to negate enemy satellites, such systems could also be used to defeat missiles in flight in a missile defense role. Earth oriented space weapons may provide new, more effective ways to perform air or sea supremacy missions, interdiction., close 
support, or suppression.
, When force applications missions can be performed effectively by space systems, then it will be true of space what Major Billy Hitchell said of air power in 1917: "A cardinal principle in 
warefare (is that ) a decision in the air must be sought and 
obtained before a decision on the ground can be reached. 1113 Look down/shoot down spacecraft will not be invincible, but they will have a profound advantage over terrestrial forces. Mature technologies of the type which the President's Space Defense Initiative promises will be able to destroy not only missiles and 
spacecraft, but also aircraft, ships, equipment, and facilities 
on, earth.
Force enhancement missions cannot affect military operations 
as directly as force applications, but they have become critical in their own right. Well trained and disciplined military forces
are able to fight effectively as individual units, but they mustbe able to group and attack the enemy when and where he is weak
or vulnerable. Timely reconnaissance and surveillance and 
reliable and secure communications are required for this* 
especially at the campaign or theater levels of action, 
Moreover, the effectiveness of such attacks must be enhanced by 
accurate navigation and targeting and must not be stalled by 
weather conditions which could have been avoided or exploited*
SECTION 111 
THE THREAT
U«S* military forces have grown to depend on the support that 
space systems provide. It is a mistake, however, to take for granted that space systems will be there whenever needed, Thtrt is a threat, The Soviets will attack U.S. space system* in 
crisie or conflict. It is consistent with their doctrine f with the fact 0'£ their weapons development, and with reason.
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'The tone of Soviet military doctrin is captured by Col A.A. 
Sidorenko, Doctor of Military Science, in the introduction to his 
book The Of fen s_iye; "...only the offensive leads to the 
attainment of victory over the enemy/" 14 The Defense 
Intelligence Agency suggests that "Space Supremacy" is what the 
Soviets will seek in order to prevail on "Space Warefare". 15 
Space Supremacy is defined as a "*..situation in which the 
military space systems of one side have decisive superiority over 
the systems of the other side". 16 The methods to such an end are 
described in the Soviet Military Enclycopedia under "Antispace 
Defense 11 . "Antispace Defense can be thus accomplished through 
such means as builiding satellite sensors, jamming 
communications, and destruction of ground installations as well 
as destruction of the spacecraft itself". 17
The state of Soviet space weapons developments suggests that 
the above doctrinal statements are more than mere academic 
definitions. The Soviet Union already has an operational 
antisatellite (ASAT) weapon. The 1985 edition.of Soviet Military 
Power describes numerous space weapons developments including 
ground based and airborne lasers, neutral particle beam weapons, 
high energy mircrowave, and high velocity impact weapons. 18 
Aside from the doctrinal statements and the implications of their 
weapons development, it stands to reason that the Soviets will 
attack U.S. space systems in crisis or conflict. They would gain 
more than they would risk. Figure 1 below poses the four 
possibilities with respect to the wartime operational status of 
U.S. and USSR space systems and assesses the relative advantage 
of each.
1.
2.
3.
4.
U.S.
OP
OP
NON OP
WON OP
USSR
NON OP
OP
NON OP
OP
i
ADVANTAGE
U.S.
PARITY
USSR
USSR
Figure 1
Relative Advantages
In line 1, the U.S. has wartime advantages because its space 
systems are operational but Soviets' are not.
Line 2 suggests that the U.S. and Soviets sustained their own 
space operations. Despite the earlier discussion of the 
technological superiority of U.S. space systems, the assessment
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in line 2 is "Parity". There are two reasons. First, Soviet 
space systems may be less capable than those of the U.S., but that is not to say that they are inadequate. Second, Soviet 
space systems are designed to perform specific military functions 
and are not required to perform the mulitple or non-military tasks as is usually the case in U.S. space systems. Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense, Admiral Gorshkov is credited with having said, "Better is the enemy of good enough". 19 No matter how much better U.S. space systems might be, Soviet space systems are good enough.
Line 3 represents a devastating ASAT campaign by both sides 
after which neither side has operational space systems left. The Soviets have the advantage for three reasons. First, the Soviets depend on their space systems less than U.S. forces do. 20 The probable location of a future conflict will be closer to the USSR that to the U.S., thus long haul satellite communications 
will not be as critical to Soviet forces as to those of the U.S.. Moreover, the Soviets save older systems rather than discard them, thus contributing to their depth. Second, while Soviet forces have real numerical superiority, it is U.S. forces that 
need force multiplication* Attribution on both sides favors the larger forces. Third, the Soviets will start the war and, therefore, will have the advantage of the initial offensive. Offensive forces certainly rely on communications, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance, but not to the extent that a defending 
smaller force must.
Line 4 is the reverse of line 1 and the Soviets have the 
advantage.
If one accepts the above as representative, then it is 
clearly to the Soviets' advantage to attack U.S. space systems 
even if their own is lost in the process. The worst result they face for the attempt is the parity of line 2. If they are 
confident in their launch reserve to fill attrition losses, they 
can optimistically expect the advantage in line 4.
The Soviets will attack U.S. space systems as soon as they have decided that conflict with the U.S. is necessary and 
unavoidable.
WHAT U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS WILL BE ATTACKED?
With unlimited resources, Soviet leaders would destroy all U.S. space capabilities. Each lost U.S. mission would have a debilitating effect on the forces which depended upon it. They 
will not have unlimited resources, so they must establish priorities.
Earlier, communications, reconnaissance, and surveillance 
were said to be critical force enhancement space missions. Generally, any critical capability for one side is a critical target for the other. The Soviets will have delivered a severe
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blow if they are able to deny the United States use of its 
reconnaissance , surveillance, and communications satellites.
Early warning surveillance satellites, however, fall into a 
different category of consideration. Certainly the missions they 
perform are critical. Their loss would degrade the survivability 
of strategic retaliatory forces. But Soviet attacks, or even 
suspicion of such attacks, against early warning systems would 
alert U.S. forces and possibly drive them to preemptive strikes. 
The potential consequences of attacking U.S. early warning 
systems outweigh the benefits.
HOW WILL U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS BE ATTACKED?
Space systems can be defeated by attacking the satellite 
constellation, its earth support system, or both. The methods 
for destroying earth support systems are not new. As a matter of 
fact, they are all too simple. Unconventional forces, sleeper 
agents, and surrogate terrorists can destroy satellite control 
stations, launch sites, or user processing facilities using small 
arms, plastic explosives, incendiaries, biological/chemical 
agents, trucks, automobiles, or airplanes. Such forces and 
attacks would be hard to detect and defend against.
Destroying satellite control stations and user processing 
facilities would force satellite platforms and payloads to go 
untended. Some systems, such as communications satellites, would 
degrade gracefully. Sooner or later, however, they would drift 
out of attitude or orbit limits and become useless. The 
degradation would be more abrupt on other satellites which 
require frequent and periodic programming. They would come to 
the end of their last programmed activity and cease to perform 
their mission. "The worst case is a low altitude reconnaissance 
satellite that requires both frequent command and control and a 
great deal of processing to get the reconnaissance information, 
into usable form." 21
Destroying launch sites augments as ASAT campaign. As the 
ASAT attacks destroy on-orbit capability, launch site destruction 
prevents replacement from the earth. Striking launch sites would 
be an effective way of separating an enemy from his reserves.
The advantages of attacking earth support systems are 
simplicity, covertness, and multiplicity of effects. Simple 
weapons and methods against a few well selected earth support 
targets can be broadly effective in degrading space missions. 
Further, enemy actions in the form of sabotage or terrorism might 
be hard to distinguish from the civil turmoil which likely will 
accompany the crisis at hand. Finally, successful attacks 
against launch and satellite control facilities would produce 
collateral or spillover impacts on all satellites dependent on 
those facilities for support.
There are also advantages in attacking satellite
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constellations. The space segment may be the most vulnerable target in the system. Destroying a two or three satellite 
constellation in low orbit will be a relatively immediate and permanent way of denying a space mission capability. There is no graceful degradation to a space mission when the constellation is destroyed. Finally, destroying satellites somewhere in orbit 
will unlikely raise public ire as much as destroying a shuttle on the pad or any other facility in the U.S. with full media 
coverage. This may be an important consideration during a crisis before hostilities begin.
Anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) fall into three categories; kinetic energy weapons (KEWs), directed energy weapons (DEWs), 
and electronic warfare weapons (EWs). 22 Any of these can be 
mounted on mobile or fixed land, sea, or air platforms. In the future, they will also be mounted on satellites. A single weapon 
at a fixed location will have as few as two windows of 
opportunity per day against a low orbit target simply because that is how often the target crosses the area of weapons control. More proliferated, geographically dispersed systems or mobile 
systems increase those windows of opportunity. The best of all 
worlds would be proliferated air, land, sea, and space mounted 
weapons.
The only operational ASAT in the world is a Soviet KEW, the 
orbital ASAT. Employing a space booster, it achieves an orbit from which it can overtake and fire a single shot of pellets at its target. 23 The U.S. developmental air launched ASAT is also a KEW. It is launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft, not into 
orbit, but on a direct ascent course to intercept its target. KEWs could also be mounted on small boosters or on satellites. The time duration between attack initiation and culmination can be an important consideration with KEWs. If the ASAT requires an hour or more of pursuit, the target can evade destruction provided it is configured and adequately warned to do so. It is 
even conceivable that a KEW ASAT could itself be destroyed in flight by space protection forces. Barring such an anti-ASAT development, the final results of a KEW ASAT campaign would depend on whether the ASAT attacks could be sustained longer than the target constellation could evade.
DEWs will strike targets at the speed of light and will thus 
eliminate time duration considerations. If these weapons can deliver enough energy to catastrophically destroy satellites, then the attacker will indeed have the advantage.
EWs can be employed to interfere with or otherwise impair 
satellite operations. Electronic jamming could be employed 
against satellite or earth support receivers to prevent uplinks 
or downlinks respectively. Except for some rare cases where a 
satellite was critically dependent on an uplink or downlink to or from a particular satellite control station, the effect of jamming satellite command and control links seems to be very transient and non-lethal. The most effective EW jamming would be
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against geostationary communications satellites. Effective
jamming of a sufficient number of satellites would critically 
re d'Uce communi cat i ons wor1dwi d e .
The most likely Soviet strategy would be to combine attacks 
against earth support and satellite constellations of a few 
selected space missions. The missions selected would be those 
considered, most threatening to Soviet forces or. most debilitating 
to U*S, forces* The combined effect of such an attack on all 
fronts would be their best bet for denying the U.S. use of its 
space resources.
SECTION IV 
ASSURING ACCESS TO AND USE OF SPACE
The JCS tasked CINCSPACE to "maintain assured access to and 
use of space at all times." This is an imperative which stands 
during peace as well as national crisis. The discussion in 
Section II listed the elements of access to and use of space, but 
the tasking included the words "...maintain assured..." and 
"...at all times...." These words require determination. U.S. 
space systems must survive a determined Soviet attack. The 
published material available on space system survivability and 
endurability can be reduced to three concepts: systemic 
survivability, protection, and reserve strength and flexibility.
SYSTEMIC SURVIVABILITY
Systemic survivability is the capability inherent in a 
system's design or configuration to survive damage or component 
failure. No space system is invulnerable, but certain features 
of design or deployment minimize the danger and effect of damage. 
In his book, Col Giffen lists the following features which 
enhance systemic survivability: hardening, autonomy, and 
mobility and maneuverability. 4 In different ways, they apply to 
both the earth support system and the satellite constellation.
Self contained power generation systems, protected air and 
water supplies, and bunkered or underground facilities are but a 
few examples of earth support physical hardening. Protected 
electronics and jam-resistant communications will keep the 
facility functioning within its system. Air, land, and sea 
mobile platforms provide flexibility and proliferation which add 
to the survivability of a system.
These and other hardening features are being applied to many 
existing and future earth support systems, in some cases at
considerable cost. Other systems, however, do not lend 
themselves to hardening. To harden launch facilities, for 
example, would require new concepts for booster and satellite
design. -
Systemic survivability also applies to spacecraft and their
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constellations. Electronic and physical shielding will prevent 
some levels of damage to sensitive components. Jam-resistant and 
encrypted communications links will keep the system operating 
without interference from hostile radio electronic combat. A 
satellite which can maneuver frequently and on command is an 
elusive target for KEWs in flight. Contingency maneuvers when 
approaching active, hostile DEWs will increase survivability when 
running those gauntlets. Higher orbits are safer than lower 
ones.
Booster throw weight is precious. For every pound of 
spacecraft weight devoted to survivability, a pound of mission 
capability is left behind. Spacecraft fuel for maneuverability is not only heavy, but it is limited. Sooner or later the 
spacecraft will exhaust its fuel, lose mission capability, and become an easy target. Some missions can be performed from high 
orbit, but others cannot.
The measures above can add to the survivability of some space 
systems, but they alone cannot give needed assurances.
PROTECTION
CINCSPACE is responsible for the space protection operations, but space protection is still in its infancy. Basic 
responsibilities remain unclear. CINCSPACE provides advisories 
and warnings of space hostilities to space systems owners/ 
operators through the SPADOC. Beyond that, he may provide active 
satellite defense if that kind of capability is developed. But, 
who is responsible to secure earth support facilities? The host 
military organization is responsible for tenants on military 
reservations. Normal security protection nay not be sufficient in the face of determined, clandestine operations. Further, who is responsible for those earth support facilities not on military 
reservations, such as Kennedy or Johnson Space Centers?
As the world order degrades in some hypothetical future 
crisis, critical earth support facilities must be guarded. 
Effective contingency plans to secure these facilities from a 
variety of air, land, and sea attacks must be in place. This kind of protection, however, is difficult at best. Consider the difficulty of securing the Kennedy or Vandenberg launch complexes for example. Serious difficulties exist, as well, in securing 
remote satellite control stations spread around the world.
To be effective, assessments and warnings of attacks against 
satellite constellations must be made early enough to allow 
contingency actions. However, the assessment process can be 
slow. It depends on all-source intelligence information, on detailed satellite status information from owners/operators, and 
on spacetrack data from the spacetrack network. 25 Analysis of this information must produce sufficient evidence to distinguish between an unfortunate, but not uncommon satellite failure and a deliberate, destructive attack. Warnings must then be
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transmitted to all satellite operators and to the NCA as quickly 
as possible. There is no tangible protection in this unless the 
warning keys the operator to execute systemic shielding or
evasive actions.
It has been suggested that an antisatellite system similar to 
the P-15 air launched ASAT would protect U.S. space sytstems by
detering Soviet ASAT attacks. 26 This logic is unclear. The 
discussion of Figure 1 in Section III suggested that the Soviets 
would gain an overall advantage by destroying U.S. satettites, 
even if their own were destroyed in the process. However, a 
fundamental prerequisite for deterrence is that "...the enemy 
must value and rely on his space systems as much more than, you 
do,..." 27 The F-15 air launched ASAT would not deter Soviet 
ASATs any more than the F-15 fighter itself would deter Soviet 
Migs.
There will not be any real protection of U.S. satellites 
until protection forces have the capability to destroy Soviet 
ASAT weapons* KEWs could be destroyed in flight by advanced DEWs 
for example* As difficult as that would be, that is the easy 
case. What about weapons which attack too quickly to be 
destroyed in flight? What about DEWs, EWs, or hypervelocity 
weapons based in the Soviet Union, where to destroy the weapon 
would be to attack the Soviet homeland. Soviet ASAT facilities 
would undoubtedly be damaged or destroyed during a central 
nuclear exchange, but it was suggested earlier that Soviet ASAT 
activity could be expected much earlier than, that* A decision, to 
attack facilities within the Soviet Union during a serious crisis 
or conflict would have grave implications, yet not doing so, or 
deciding to do so too slowly, would result in the loss of 
critical satellites or even constellations.
STRONG 1MB FLEXIBLE RESERVE
Despite efforts to develop survivable space systems and 
effective protection systems and operations* critical space 
systems are too few to escape significant, loss in conflict. 
Space system survibability efforts must Include the ability to 
replace attrition, losses with strong and flexible reserves*
Redundant, proliferated facilities and mobile earth support 
platforms provide reserve and flexibility to sustain space 
operations. Civil satellite operations could provide reserve 
satellite control and user processing facilities If agreements 
which allow commercial cargo aircraft to augment DOD airlift in 
emergencies might serve as examples* Compatibility and incentive 
issues could be worked out*
In space, large constellations provide inherent reserves* 
Sotte orbits, usually high orbits* allow the luxury of on~orbit 
satellite" sparing, ' Not all satellites fly in high orbits nor in 
large conste111ations however. Many fly in small constellations 
at low altitudest These depend on reserves which must be
launched from. Kennedy or Vandenberg when needed.
Each space launch, Space Shuttle or otherwise, represents the 
end of a lengthy and carefully phased pipeline which may have begun years earlier with-booster and satellite procurementprogramming. Ideally, booster and satellite launch ready dates 
coincide with operational need dates. While this scheme has 
served the practical concerns of cost effectiveness very well, it provides little or no ready reserve for premature failure, or, 
more to the point, attrition.
SECTION V
CONCLUSION
Space systems perform critical space missions for the MCA and U.S. military forces in peace, but especially in crisis and 
conflict,. Admiral James D, Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, 
stated, during the May 1985 Naval Space,, symposium at the Naval Post Graduate Schoo1:
Our ability to maintain sea control will be in jeopardy 
without space control. Our capability to win the battle 
of the first salvo will not be determined solely by ourperformance within the classic three dimensions of theterrestrial ocean, environment. Rather, it will be determined by the way we use all four dimensions - air, 
s e a, u nd e1 r s e a, a nd s p a c e.
Ma jor Ge nera1 Rober t A. Ro s e nbe rg, Director, Defense Mappi ngAgency and former Vice CINCNORAD, wrote, "The simple fact is 
...that advantage is dependent on our exploration of space for the support o f our fo rces." 2 8
Further, General .Rosen.berg asks, "At what point can. an 
adversary engage American forces and not afford to hold 
sate11i tes a t r i sk?" 2 9
The United States and the Soviet Union could be drawn, to the brink of conflict by conditions which neither side could 
completely control. If conflict appeared unavoidable to Sovietleaders, they would direct their space forces to attack the most 
critical U.S. space systems.
U.S. space systems must servive such an attack to enhance 
and multiply the effectiveness of terrestrial forces* To 
survive/ they must be capable and rugged, but that is not enough. No space system is unvulnerable. Earth support systems as well
as satellites .must be protected. Forces and strategies must be developed to put teeth into space protection concepts in order to defeat' attacks and suppress enemy ASATs. Even with survivabilityfeatures and protection forces, considerable U.S. space systems
will be struck and destroyed during a conflict. They are too important and there are too few of then to expect otherwise.
Reserve capability must be available to replace losses. There 
are ways to do it.
Maintain assured access to and use of space at all times. 
Take the high ground and hold it. This is the task of CINCSPACE.
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